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Abstract According to the classic “argument from design,”
observations of complex functionality in nature can be taken
to imply the action of a supernatural designer, just as the
purposeful construction of human artifacts reveals the hand of
the artificer. The argument from design has been in use for
millennia, but it is most commonly associated with the
nineteenth century English theologian William Paley and his
1802 treatise Natural Theology, or Evidence of the Existence
and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances
of Nature. The book remains relevant more than 200 years
after it was written, in large part because arguments very
similar to Paley’s underlie current challenges to the teaching
of evolution (indeed, his name arises with considerable
frequency in associated discussions). This paper provides an
accessible overview of the arguments presented by Paley in
Natural Theology and considers them both in their own
terms and in the context of contemporary issues.
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Teleological argument
I did not at that time [as a Cambridge theology student,
1827–1831] trouble myself about Paley’s premises;
and taking these on trust, I was charmed and
convinced by the long line of argumentation. (p. 59)
The old argument from design in nature, as given by
Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive,




The “teleological argument,” better known as the “argument
from design,” is the claim that the appearance of “design” in
nature—such as the complexity, order, purposefulness, and
functionality of living organisms—can only be explained by
the existence of a “designer” (typically of the supernatural
variety). In its most familiar manifestation, the argument
from design involves drawing parallels between human-
designed objects (e.g., telescopes, outboard motors) and
biological counterparts with similar functional roles (e.g.,
eyes, bacterial flagella). The former are complex, often
indivisibly so if they are to maintain their current function,
clearly perform specific functions, and are known to have
been the product of intentional design. The functional
complexity of living organisms is far greater still, it is
argued, and, therefore, must present even stronger evidence
for the role of intelligent agency.
Though the basic premise of the teleological argument had
been articulated by thinkers as far back as ancient Greece and
Rome, today it is almost universally associated with the
writings of one person: William Paley (Fig. 1). Paley was
born in July 1743 in Peterborough, Cambridgeshire,
England. He was educated at Christ’s College, Cambridge,
and was ordained a deacon in 1766 and soon thereafter a
priest in Cambridge. He was appointed Archdeacon of
Carlisle Cathedral in 1782 and awarded a Doctor of Divinity
degree at Cambridge in 1795. He authored several successful
theological works, the best-known being Natural Theology,
or Evidence of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity,
Collected from the Appearances of Nature.
Natural Theology was published in 1802, only
three years before Paley’s death on May 25, 1805. It was
very successful, going through ten editions in the first
four years alone (see Fyfe 2002). Despite being written in
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labyrinthine prose (by modern standards), Natural Theolo-
gy remains an especially lucid exposition of the classic
argument from design. This undoubtedly is one of the
reasons that Paley’s name is most commonly linked with
the design argument even though it was by no means
original to him.1
Darwin was influenced by Paley’s work, and some
modern authors have cited it as an important example of
pre-Darwinian “adaptationist” thinking (e.g., Dawkins
1986; Williams 1992; but see Gliboff 2000; McLaughlin
2008). Whatever its significance in the past, it is clear that
Paley’s contribution continues to be of direct relevance in
the current educational and political climate. Notably,
Natural Theology was exhibit P-751 in the landmark 2005
Kitzmiller v. Dover trial, which successfully challenged the
constitutionality of promoting “intelligent design” in US
public schools. Paley’s name appears more than 80 times in
the trial testimony transcripts, and he is mentioned a further
half a dozen times in Judge Jones’s decision.2
In light of their continuing importance in current
discourse, it is worth exploring the arguments presented in
Paley’s classic treatise. This review is intended to provide a
“guided tour” of Natural Theology,3 giving the reader an
abridged and annotated rendition of Paley’s widely
referenced (but less often read) account of the argument
from design.
Watches and Watchmakers
Natural Theology opens with the paragraph for which it is
best (if not exclusively) known, in which Paley draws a
contrast between a rock and a pocket watch:4
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against
a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be
there; I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I
knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor
would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity
of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon
the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch
happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of
the answer which I had before given, that, for any
thing I knew, the watch might have always been there.
Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as
well as for the stone? why is it not as admissible in
the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and
for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the
watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the
stone) that its several parts are framed and put
together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed
and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so
regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if
the different parts had been differently shaped from
Fig. 1 William Paley (1743–1805). Portrait circa 1790 by George
Romney (National Portrait Gallery, London)
1 John Ray’s 1691 treatise The Wisdom of God Manifested in the
Works of the Creation was a notable forerunner (available online:
http://books.google.ca/books?id=HvQ4AAAAMAAJ).
2 Online copies are available for both the transcripts (http://ncseweb.
org/creationism/legal/kitzmiller-trial-transcripts) and the decision
(http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/kitzmiller/kitzmiller_342.pdf).
3 The first edition of Natural Theology of 1802 is available in the
Oxford World’s Classics series from Oxford University Press. Quotes
and associated page numbers given in this review come from the 12th
edition, as provided by The Complete Work of Charles Darwin Online
(http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=A142). A later
edition is also available at Google Books (http://books.google.com/
books?id=-XFHAAAAIAAJ). The differences between editions are
minor.
4 Like many of the arguments most famously attributed to Paley, an
analogy to a timepiece was used by various thinkers before him. For
example, Marcus Tullius Cicero wrote in his De Natura Deorum in
45 BCE: “When you see a sundial or a waterclock, you see that it tells
the time by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that
the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it
embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their
artificers?” Numerous other examples are reviewed by Moore (2009).
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what they are, of a different size from what they are,
or placed after any other manner, or in any other
order, than that in which they are placed, either no
motion at all would have been carried on in the
machine, or none which would have answered the use
that is now served by it. (p.1–2)
Thus, in the very first passage of a book written more
than two centuries ago, Paley encapsulates the core
components of the argument from design—an argument
that has been revived in much the same form by proponents
of “intelligent design.” Specifically, Paley points out that
the watch exhibits an irreducibly complex organization that
was obviously constructed to perform a specific function.
Remove or rearrange any of its intricate inner workings,
and the watch becomes barely more effective at keeping
time than the rock formerly dismissed with a kick.5 From
this, Paley concludes that
...the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch
must have had a maker: that there must have existed,
at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer
or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we
find it actually to answer; who comprehended its
construction, and designed its use. (p.3)
Furthermore, like modern proponents of the argument
from design, Paley argues that one need not know any
details of the designer’s identity or methods to conclude
that an intelligent agent was involved:
Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion,
that we had never seen a watch made; that we had
never known an artist capable of making one; that we
were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of
workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what
manner it was performed; all this being no more than
what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art,
of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of
the more curious productions of modern manufacture.
(p.3–4)
Today’s neo-Paleyans must also concur with Paley that
the watch’s delicate functionality could not be the product
of chance, inherent “principles of order,” or laws of matter,
nor merely an illusion of design. For Paley, this conclusion
supersedes all other considerations and renders additional
details largely superfluous. As he wrote,
Neither...would our observer be driven out of his
conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by
being told that he knew nothing at all about the
matter. He knows enough for his argument: he knows
the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and
adaptation of the means to the end. These points
being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts
concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his
reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little, need
not beget a distrust of that which he does know.6 (p.7)
However, given their aggressive resistance to the notion
of suboptimality or nonfunction of biological structures,7 it
appears that many modern design proponents disagree with
Paley’s subsequent assertions that neither imperfections nor
ambiguous—or even nonexistent—functions refute the
thesis of design for the origin of complex, (mostly)
functional objects or organs. In this sense, Paley could be
said to adhere more closely to the analogy with human
artifacts than do many of his present-day counterparts:
Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion,
that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it
seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the
machinery, the design, and the designer, might be
evident, and in the case supposed would be evident,
in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of
the movement, or whether we could account for it or
not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in
order to show with what design it was made: still less
necessary, where the only question is, whether it were
made with any design at all. (p.4–5)
Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the
argument, if there were a few parts of the watch,
concerning which we could not discover, or had not
yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the
general effect; or even some parts, concerning which
we could not ascertain, whether they conduced to that
effect in any manner whatever. For...if by the loss, or
disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the
movement of the watch were found in fact to be
stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would
remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of
these parts, although we should be unable to
investigate the manner according to which, or the
connexion by which, the ultimate effect depended
5 But, as the old cliché goes, even a broken watch gives the correct
time twice per day.
6 For Paley, biochemistry represented a particularly impenetrable
frontier that reinforced the existence of a designer with a more
thorough knowledge of chemistry (pp.83–91). For their part, modern
design proponents tend to focus on subcellular and molecular features
whose origins have only recently become amenable to investigation.
7 A prime example is provided by so-called junk DNA. A common
myth, repeatedly invoked by anti-evolutionists, science writers, and
misinformed biologists alike, asserts that potential functions for non-
genic components of the genome were long dismissed by mainstream
science. Reference to the scientific literature from the relevant time
period thoroughly undermines this claim (http://genomicron.blogspot.
com/2008/02/junk-dna-quotes-of-interest-series.html).
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upon their action or assistance; and the more complex
is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to
arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely,
that there were parts which might be spared, without
prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we
had proved this by experiment,—these superfluous
parts, even if we were completely assured that they
were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we
had instituted concerning other parts. The indication
of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly
as it was before. (p.5–6)
Continuing with the analogy of the watch, Paley next
argues that one could not explain away the evidence of
design even if the watch in hand had, through some
exceptional mechanics, been produced by the self-
replication of a parental watch. It matters not, according
to Paley, whether any particular entity had been born of
similar entities, as this accounts only for its existence and
not its complex functional characteristics. Indeed, discov-
ering the watch’s capacity to reproduce would only
increase an observer’s admiration for its remarkable
complexity:
No answer is given to this question, by telling us that
a preceding watch produced it. There cannot be
design without a designer; contrivance without a
contriver; order without choice; arrangement, without
any thing capable of arranging; subserviency and
relation to a purpose, without that which could intend
a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing
their office, in accomplishing that end, without the
end ever having been contemplated, or the means
accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of
parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of
instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelli-
gence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally
believe, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from
which the watch before us issued, was the proper
cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it;—
could be truly said to have constructed the instrument,
disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined
their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined
their several motions into one result, and that also a
result connected with the utilities of other beings. All
these properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted
for, as they were before. (p.11–12)
Thus, Paley argues, no matter how many generations of
watches beget watches (or, by obvious implication, organ-
isms produce offspring or cells generate daughter cells), the
specific, irreducible, and purposeful arrangement of
watches’ inner workings can only be attributed to the
action of intelligent agency.
The Cosmic Optician
Having established the connection between watches and
watchmakers, Paley begins his third chapter by arguing that
the principle applies equally to living organisms and their
components—or indeed, more so, given that their degree of
adaptive complexity is vastly greater. As he might have
argued, human hands more thoroughly evince design than
anything crafted by them.
As did many of his predecessors8 (and followers), Paley
considered eyes to provide a particularly illuminating
exemplar of organic design: “there is precisely the same
proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the
telescope was made for assisting it” (p. 18). Paley noted
that telescopes and eyes rely on similar optical principles
but that in fact vertebrate eyes are much more effective by
virtue of their ability to adjust to different distances and
brightness, in their well-developed protective features
including eyelids and nictitating membranes, and by their
capacity to correct for spherical aberration. In fact, he
pointed out, telescope designers solved the problem of
aberration by adopting features observed in biological
lenses. In the absence of a natural explanation for their
occurrence, eyes provided one of the best-known cases in
support of the design argument. Darwin exposed the fallacy
of this conclusion, and the efforts of countless scientists
since then have resolved in increasingly fine detail how the
various components of eyes are likely to have evolved.9
In considering the eyes of different types of animals,
Paley noted two critical facts: (1) that eyes differ according
to the environment in which they are used to see and (2)
that despite these differences, all vertebrate eyes are
constructed according to the same basic physical plan.
Eyes specialized for sight underwater, on land, or in the
dark are not fundamentally different from each other;
rather, they are modifications of a general theme: “Thus,
in comparing the eyes of different kinds of animals, we see,
in their resemblances and distinctions, one general plan laid
down, and that plan varied with the varying exigencies to
which it is to be applied” (p. 31). Today, this similarity
amidst diversity is explained by the fact that all vertebrates
share a common ancestor that was possessed of eyes and
8 For example, Paley cites the work of Johann Christophorous Sturm
from a century before: “Sturmius held, that the examination of the eye
was a cure for atheism” (p.33). Paley himself wrote that “Were there
no example in the world, of contrivance, except that of the eye, it
would be alone sufficient to support the conclusion which we draw
from it, as to the necessity of an intelligent Creator” (p.75).
9 For two recent special issues of peer-reviewed journals dedicated to
eye evolution, see Evolution: Education and Outreach volume 1, issue
4, Oct. 2008 (http://www.springerlink.com/content/m3k441k67q3n/)
and Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B volume 364,
issue 1531, Oct. 19, 2009 (http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/
content/364/1531.toc).
Evo Edu Outreach (2009) 2:602–611 605
that specializations to different lifestyles have involved
descent with modification of this ancestral organ.
The fact that all eyes have evolved through the
modification of prior form and the cooption of preexisting
components also explains some otherwise puzzling struc-
tural complications (not to mention features that are
downright maladaptive; see Novella 2008 for several
examples). However, through his teleological lens, Paley
viewed complexities as further evidence of good design, as
with his example of muscles in the eyes of cassowaries:
In the configuration of the muscle which, though
placed behind the eye, draws the nictitating membrane
over the eye, there is...a marvellous mechanism....The
muscle is passed through a loop formed by another
muscle: and is there inflected, as if it were round a
pulley. This is a peculiarity; and observe the advantage
of it. A single muscle with a straight tendon, which is
the common muscular form, would have been suffi-
cient, if it had had power to draw far enough. But the
contraction, necessary to draw the membrane over the
whole eye, required a longer muscle than could lie
straight at the bottom of the eye. Therefore, in order to
have a greater length in a less compass, the cord of the
main muscle makes an angle. This, so far, answers the
end; but, still further, it makes an angle, not round a
fixed pivot, but round a loop formed by another
muscle; which second muscle, whenever it contracts,
of course twitches the first muscle at the point of
inflection, and thereby assists the action designed by
both. (p.37–38; italics in original)
In mammals, the recurrent laryngeal nerve provides a
connection between the brain and the larynx, though not a
direct one. Instead of taking a direct route, it passes down
into the chest, circles under the aorta, and ascends back up
to the neck (in giraffes, this nerve is more than 2 meters
long; Harrison 1995). Similarly, the mammalian vas
deferens connects the testes to the urethra, but not before
passing into the pelvic cavity, looping around the urinary
bladder and then descending back to complete its circuitous
path. Meanwhile, the urethra itself passes directly through
the prostate gland, an arrangement that readily engenders
urinary difficulties if the prostate becomes swollen. It is
only with great effort that arrangements such as these might
be characterized as optimizations rather than as simple
quirks of evolutionary history10 (for additional examples,
see Williams 1997; Shubin 2008; Coyne 2009).
But why bother with eyes at all? If the designer is
omnipotent, why does the detection of visual information
require such a complex arrangement of lenses, receptors,
nerves, muscles, and neurons? In Paley’s words,
Why make the difficulty in order to surmount it? If to
perceive objects by some other mode than that of
touch, or objects which lay out of the reach of that
sense, were the thing proposed; could not a simple
volition of the Creator have communicated the
capacity? Why resort to contrivance, where power is
omnipotent? Contrivance, by its very definition and
nature, is the refuge of imperfection. To have recourse
to expedients, implies difficulty, impediment, re-
straint, defect of power. (p.39)
Thus answers Paley his own rhetorical queries:
...beside reasons of which probably we are ignorant,
one answer is this: It is only by the display of
contrivance, that the existence, the agency, the
wisdom of the Deity, could be testified to his rational
creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to all
the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so
far as it depends upon the phenomena, or the works of
nature. Take away this, and you take away from us
every subject of observation, and ground of reason-
ing; I mean as our rational faculties are formed at
present. Whatever is done, God could have done
without the intervention of instruments or means: but
it is in the construction of instruments, in the choice
and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence is
seen. It is this which constitutes the order and beauty
of the universe. God, therefore, has been pleased to
prescribe limits to his own power, and to work his end
within those limits. (p.40)
According to Paley, the exquisite function of eyes
bespeaks the great power of a designer, but the very
decision to create eyes reflects an intentional limitation of
this power so that humans might understand how eyes came
to be. This logic may strike the modern reader as rather
tortuous, but it serves to illustrate a very important point:
that any explanation for complex organs must account not
only for their adaptive characteristics but also their
imperfections. Today, this duality can be accounted for by
the countervailing influences of adaptive modification and
the constraints of genetics, anatomy, and history, but for
Paley, the intent of a designer provided the only conceiv-
able answer. As noted, Paley did not consider imperfections
to challenge the conclusion that design indicates the work
of a designer. It is only if one wishes to defend the
infallibility of the designer that one must assume all
features of an object to be functional, and optimally so
(see pp.56–57). Paley considered nonfunctional aspects of
organisms to be “extremely rare,” and as is clear from later
chapters, he viewed most aspects of the world to be
10 Paley does make an effort to portray the tiny vestigial eyes of
moles, which are permanently covered with skin, as an example of
good design (pp.273–274).
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optimally designed, but he was careful not to base his
argument for the existence of a designer on these secondary
considerations. Again, this represents something of a more
sophisticated application of the argument from design than
is often encountered in contemporary discourse.
Not a Chance
One of the most obstinate misconceptions about evolution-
ary theory is that it hypothesizes that eyes and other
complex organs arise “by chance.” Even under the most
charitable assessment, such a view of adaptive evolution
must be considered deeply misguided. Whereas genetic
mutation is both integral to the process and indeed is
random with respect to its effects, natural selection is, by
definition, the nonrandom survival and reproduction of
individuals. Variation is generated at random, but whether
or not it is preserved depends on its effects on survival and
reproduction within a given environment11 (for reviews, see
Gregory 2008, 2009). No serious evolutionary biologist of
the past 150 years has suggested that the emergence of
complex organs is merely the result of chance.
Writing as he did before Darwin and Wallace proposed
the theory of natural selection, it was not possible for Paley
to make this error (modern neo-Paleyans, by contrast, do so
with remarkable proficiency). In the early 1800s, chance
was not the only suggested alternative to conscious design
(McLaughlin 2008), but Paley viewed its refutation as an
important part of his argument. Paley (and Darwin)
understood that chance plays a role in nature, but that it is
incapable of producing adaptive complexity:
What does chance ever do for us? In the human body,
for instance, chance, i.e. the operation of causes without
design, may produce a wen, a wart, a mole, a pimple, but
never an eye. Amongst inanimate substances, a clod, a
pebble, a liquid drop might be; but never was a watch, a
telescope, an organized body of any kind, answering
a valuable purpose by a complicated mechanism, the
effect of chance. (p.63)
Modern evolutionary biologists do not part company with
Paley on the claim that complex organs must arise through
a mechanism other than pure chance. The disagreement is
only with his subsequent assertion, that “in no assignable
instance hath such a thing existed without intention
somewhere” (p.63).
Paley takes his argument against the role of chance a step
farther, in the process raising—and summarily rejecting—a
possible explanation that exhibits shades of the principle of
natural selection. However, his description is of an ancient
version of the idea that, as Paley rightly notes, is unworkable
in practice.12
There is another answer which has the same effect as
the resolving of things into chance; which answer
would persuade us to believe, that the eye, the animal
to which it belongs, every other animal, every plant,
indeed every organized body which we see, are only
so many out of the possible varieties and combina-
tions of being, which the lapse of infinite ages has
brought into existence; that the present world is the
relict of that variety: millions of other bodily forms
and other species having perished, being by the defect
of their constitution incapable of preservation, or of
continuance by generation. Now there is no founda-
tion whatever for this conjecture in any thing which
we observe in the works of nature; no such experi-
ments are going on at present: no such energy
operates, as that which is here supposed, and which
should be constantly pushing into existence new
varieties of beings. Nor are there any appearances to
support an opinion, that every possible combination
of vegetable or animal structure has formerly been
tried. Multitudes of conformations, both of vegetables
and animals, may be conceived capable of existence
and succession, which yet do not exist. Perhaps
almost as many forms of plants might have been
found in the fields, as figures of plants can be
delineated upon paper. A countless variety of animals
might have existed, which do not exist. Upon the
supposition here stated, we should see unicorns and
mermaids, sylphs and centaurs, the fancies of
painters, and the fables of poets, realized by exam-
ples. Or, if it be alleged that these may transgress the
limits of possible life and propagation, we might, at
least, have nations of human beings without nails
upon their fingers, with more or fewer fingers and
toes than ten, some with one eye, others with one ear,
with one nostril, or without the sense of smelling at
all. All these, and a thousand other imaginable
varieties, might live and propagate. We may modify
any one species many different ways, all consistent
with life, and with the actions necessary to preserva-
tion, although affording different degrees of conve-
niency and enjoyment to the animal. And if we carry
11 This refers specifically to evolution by natural selection. Variation
can also be sorted by chance through genetic drift, especially when it
is neutral with respect to reproductive success and in small
populations, but this mechanism is not responsible for the evolution
of complex adaptations.
12 Similar notions of extreme trial-and-error date back to the ancient
Greeks, including Lucretius and Empedocles (Gliboff 2000).
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these modifications through the different species
which are known to subsist, their number would be
incalculable. No reason can be given why, if these
deperdits ever existed, they have now disappeared.
Yet, if all possible existences have been tried, they
must have formed part of the catalogue. (p.63–65)
The problem, of course, is not the notion that great variety
may arise by chance and be narrowed by differential
survival—this is the basis of natural selection as it is now
understood. Rather, the implausibility of Paley’s scenario is
the scale at which he considered the process. Specifically,
he envisioned an unconstrained morphospace in which
drastically divergent species continually pop into existence.
This lies in stark contrast to Darwin’s later emphasis on
small-scale variation arising within species and then being
sorted generation by generation.
In this context, it is also worth noting Paley’s view on
extinction—namely that it does not happen. According to
Paley, the classification of species into larger taxa would be
rendered impossible by widespread extinction. In contrast,
extinction was established as a common process in the
history of life by Darwin’s time, and today it is acknowl-
edged that the overwhelming majority of species that have
existed no longer grace the Earth. In fact, the major
divisions among extant lineages are now understood to
exist precisely because so many ancestors and intermediate
forms have perished.
Design and Diversity
The preceding arguments occupy only the first six of the 27
chapters in Natural Theology. In Chapters 7 through 20,
Paley leads the reader on an expedition through the annals
of early nineteenth century biological knowledge as he
understands it, pausing along the way to admire the
elegance of the bones (Chapter 8), muscles (Chapter 9),
blood vessels (Chapter 10), and digestive systems (Chapters
7 and 10) of vertebrates, as well as features of insects
(Chapter 19) and plants (Chapter 20) which, though less
well understood, he also described as bearing the hallmarks
of design.
Once again, modern biology does not contradict Paley’s
enthusiastic exposition of features well-suited to specific
functions, only the way in which their origin is explained.
Similarly, Paley takes a broad comparative approach that
would be at home in modern evolutionary biology were it
interpreted from a different perspective. He recognizes that
specializations for particular lifestyles reflect modifications
of traits shared by many animals. He grasps the unity of
underlying body plans. And he notes that though it
dissipates among groups living in widely divergent habitats,
the similarity does not disappear. Consider the following
passages from Chapter 12 on “Comparative Anatomy”:
Whenever we find a general plan pursued, yet with
such variations in it as are, in each case, required by
the particular exigency of the subject to which it is
applied, we possess, in such plan and such adaptation,
the strongest evidence that can be afforded of
intelligence and design; an evidence which most
completely excludes every other hypothesis. If the
general plan proceeded from any fixed necessity in
the nature of things, how could it accommodate itself
to the various wants and uses which it had to serve
under different circumstances, and on different occa-
sions? (p.211)
Very much of this reasoning is applicable to what has
been called Comparative Anatomy. In their general
economy, in the outlines of the plan, in the construc-
tion as well as offices of their principal parts, there
exists between all large terrestrial animals a close
resemblance. In all, life is sustained, and the body
nourished by nearly the same apparatus. The heart,
the lungs, the stomach, the liver, the kidneys, are
much alike in all. The same fluid (for no distinction of
blood has been observed) circulates through their
vessels, and nearly in the same order. The same cause,
therefore, whatever that cause was, has been
concerned in the origin, has governed the production
of these different animal forms.
When we pass on to smaller animals, or to the
inhabitants of a different element, the resemblance
becomes more distant and more obscure; but still the
plan accompanies us. (pp.212–213)
Chapter 13 deals with the opposite subject, namely
adaptations (“Peculiar Organizations”) that are unique to
particular groups: features of the neck of large mammals,
the swim bladder of fishes, the fangs of snakes, the pouches
of marsupials, the claws of birds, the stomach of camels,
the tongue of woodpeckers, and the curved tusks of wild
boars. These, like functional traits shared more broadly,
also reflect the remarkable fit of species to their environ-
ments which Paley takes as strong evidence for their origin
by design.
In Chapter 14, Paley lends particular credence to
examples of adaptive features that emerge ontogenetically
before they are needed, in preparation for use later in life
(“Prospective Contrivances”):
I can hardly imagine to myself a more distinguishing
mark, and, consequently, a more certain proof of
design, than preparation, i.e. the providing of things
beforehand, which are not to be used until a
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considerable time afterwards; for this implies a
contemplation of the future, which belongs only to
intelligence. (p.252)
The teeth of mammals, the milk that nourishes their young,
their eyes that develop while still in the darkness of the
womb, and their lungs that form before encountering any
opportunity to draw a breath—in the absence of knowledge
about developmental genetics, these struck Paley as
especially weighty examples of foresightful design.
Fitting Together
Paley does not only rely on individual examples of function
to support his position. In addition, he expounds upon the
close interaction of parts in service of a specific function.
He returns to the analogy of the watch in this capacity at the
opening of Chapter 15:
When several different parts contribute to one effect;
or, which is the same thing, when an effect is
produced by the joint action of different instruments;
the fitness of such parts or instruments to one another,
for the purpose of producing, by their united action
the effect, is what I call relation: and wherever this is
observed in the works of nature or of man, it appears
to me to carry along with it decisive evidence of
understanding, intention, art. In examining, for in-
stance, the several parts of a watch, the spring, the
barrel, the chain, the fusee, the balance, the wheels of
various sizes, forms, and positions, what is it which
would take an observer's attention, as most plainly
evincing a construction, directed by thought, deliber-
ation, and contrivance? It is the suitableness of these
parts to one another; first, in the succession and order
in which they act; and, secondly, with a view to the
effect finally produced. (pp. 261–262)
These “relations” are common in nature, and they form a
central part of the modern incarnation of the argument from
design just as they did two centuries before (albeit recast
in terms of the “specified,” “irreducibly complex,” or
“purposeful” arrangements of parts in service of a particular
function). Contemporary embodiments of the teleological
argument typically appeal to examples from microbiology
and biochemistry, but the basic approach is the same as in
Paley’s discussion of systems involved in feeding, diges-
tion, and excretion. Paley is especially taken by close
interactions among independent components (which today
are explained as the product of co-evolution):
But relation perhaps is never so striking as when it
subsists, not between different parts of the same thing,
but between different things. The relation between a
lock and a key is more obvious, than it is between
different parts of the lock. A bow was designed for an
arrow, and an arrow for a bow: and the design is more
evident for their being separate implements.
Nor do the works of the Deity want this clearest
species of relation. The sexes are manifestly made for
each other. They form the grand relation of animated
nature; universal, organic, mechanical; subsisting like
the clearest relations of art, in different individuals;
unequivocal, inexplicable without design.
So much so, that, were every other proof of
contrivance in nature dubious or obscure, this alone
would be sufficient. The example is complete.
Nothing is wanting to the argument. I see no way
whatever of getting over it. (pp. 268–270)
According to Paley, the fit of parts is also especially
significant “when the defects of one part, or of one organ,
are supplied by the structure of another part or of another
organ” (p.275), a special case of “relation” that he dubs
“compensation.” For example, the neck of an elephant is
inflexible, but this is compensated for by its dexterous
trunk. Paley’s ideas of “inconveniency” and “compensation”
are recognizable in the modern concept of tradeoffs:
When I speak of an inconveniency, I have a view to a
dilemma which frequently occurs in the works of
nature, viz. that the peculiarity of structure by which
an organ is made to answer one purpose, necessarily
unfits it for some other purpose. (pp.278–279)
Not surprisingly, the fit of organisms to their physical
environments (e.g., wings for movement in air, fins in
water) also provides evidence for design under Paley’s
view:
We have already considered relation, and under
different views; but it was the relation of parts to
parts, of the parts of an animal to other parts of the
same animal, or of another individual of the same
species.
But the bodies of animals hold, in their constitution
and properties, a close and important relation to
natures altogether external to their own; to inanimate
substances, and to the specific qualities of these, e.g.
they hold a strict relation to the elements by which
they are surrounded. (p.291; italics in original)
Paley also contemplates instincts as an example of
“relations” indicative of design. In so doing, he confronts
what are now labeled as proximate versus ultimate causes
(and, in a long-outdated dichotomy, “nature vs. nurture”).
Citing examples of reproductive behaviors—the incubation
of eggs by birds, the host specificity of egg laying by
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butterflies, the spawning journeys of salmon—he argues
that many behaviors are neither learned nor simple
reactions to stimuli but are hardwired by design.
Beyond Biology
For Paley, evidence of design is not restricted to examples
from the living world but also comes from the conditions of
the world that make life possible. Chapter 21, dedicated to
“The Elements,” considers the beneficial properties of air,
water, fire, and light. The extent of Paley’s teleological
reasoning is illustrated with particular clarity in the case of
light which, he argues, travels so fast that it might obliterate
both eyes and beholders had the designer not provided a
safeguard:13
Urged by such a velocity, with what force must its
particles drive against (I will not say the eye, the
tenderest of animal substances, but) every substance,
animate or inanimate, which stands in its way! It
might seem to be a force sufficient to shatter to atoms
the hardest bodies.
How then is this effect, the consequence of such
prodigious velocity, guarded against? By a propor-
tionable minuteness of the particles of which light is
composed. (p.376)
The properties of the sun, the planets, and the physical
laws that govern their motions also point to the action of a
designer according to Paley’s interpretation. For example,
the sun, which provides heat and light, is situated in a
convenient central location; the Earth’s axis of rotation
provides climatological stability; and the laws of gravity are
restricted to the miniscule subset of all possible config-
urations that is compatible with life. Paley held to a
particularly strong version of the anthropic principle (not
unlike one still invoked by many modern creationists):
That the subsisting law of attraction falls within the
limits which utility requires, when these limits bear so
small a proportion to the range of possibilities upon
which chance might equally have cast it, is not, with
any appearance of reason, to be accounted for, by any
other cause than a regulation proceeding from a
designing mind. But our next proposition carries the
matter somewhat further. We say, in the third place,
that, out of the different laws which lie within the
limits of admissible laws, the best is made choice of;
that there are advantages in this particular law which
cannot be demonstrated to belong to any other law;
and, concerning some of which, it can be demonstrat-
ed that they do not belong to any other. (pp. 395–396)
The Nature of the Maker
Unlike modern proponents of “intelligent design,” Paley is
totally forthright in his view on the identity of the designer.
As he concludes at the close of Chapter 23, “The marks of
design are too strong to be gotten over. Design must have
had a designer. That designer must have been a person.
That person is God.” (p.441). From this starting position,
Paley proceeds in Chapters 24 through 26 to rally evidence
from nature for the omnipotence, omniscience, and benev-
olence of the Designer. He must, therefore, contend with
examples not only confirmatory (e.g., the good fit of
organisms to their needs, the capacity for pleasure) but also
seemingly contradictory (e.g., death, disease, predation,
pain) to such a theological stance. Thus, predation is
presented as a form of population control that prevents the
potentially disastrous effects of superfecundity (and the
application of venom is a particularly merciful method of
dispatching prey). Other apparent ills are depicted as being
similarly beneficial upon closer inspection. As Paley
argues, “It is a happy world after all” (p. 456).
Design Since Darwin
As Darwin noted, Paley’s thesis that the appearance of design
must in fact be the outcome of design was refuted by the
advent of a workable theory of evolutionary change.
Nevertheless, 150 years later, biologists are still awed—but
are no longer stunned—by complexity in natural systems.
Evolutionary theory provides a means of exploring the origin
of complex adaptations using a variety of analytical
approaches (e.g., fossil record, genetics, comparative anatomy
and physiology, phylogenetics, developmental biology),
rather than drawing a conclusion based on the observation
of complexity alone. Evolutionary theory, which includes
more than adaptive mechanisms, also provides a straight-
forward explanation for suboptimality, vestigial traits, and
wastefulness, including excessive complexity and redundancy
where simpler solutions could easily be envisioned.
Interestingly, evolutionary biologists who strongly em-
phasize adaptive evolution by natural selection (e.g.,
Dawkins 1986; Williams 1992)—the theory that under-
mined Paley’s central conclusion—more often express
positive opinions of Natural Theology than do modern
proponents of the argument from design. It is not difficult
to see why, as Paley passionately addressed what they see
as the most important question in evolutionary biology: the
13 Indeed, he later states that “The eye is made for light, and light for
the eye. The eye would be of no use without light, and light perhaps of
little without eyes” (p.424).
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origins of complex adaptations. Contemporary design
proponents, by contrast, generally attempt to distance
themselves from Paley so as not to be seen as simply
repackaging a 200-year-old theological argument. The
examples may have changed (e.g., from eyes to flagella),
but the premise has not.
Concluding Remarks
Like many of the early works that have had a lasting impact
on biological thought, Paley’s Natural Theology remains
worthy of reading by the current generation of biologists,
educators, and students. It presents the argument from
design in a clear fashion, unencumbered by the mathemat-
ical and biochemical accoutrements with which it recently
has been festooned. That arguments very similar to Paley’s
are now being used in an attempt to undermine the teaching
and acceptance of evolutionary science gives Natural
Theology continued relevance. From a much more positive
point of view, his wonder at the complexity of the natural
world, expressed with sincerity and style, is something to
which all evolutionary biologists can relate. It is to be
hoped that, in time, it will be for this reason alone that
Paley’s classic treatise retains its significance.
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